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TO RADIATION PORTAL DATA1
By Siddhartha R. Dalal and Bing Han
RAND Corporation
Given the potential for illicit nuclear material being used for ter-
rorism, most ports now inspect a large number of goods entering na-
tional borders for radioactive cargo. The U.S. Department of Home-
land Security is moving toward one hundred percent inspection of all
containers entering the U.S. at various ports of entry for nuclear ma-
terial. We propose a Bayesian classification approach for the real-time
data collected by the inline Polyvinyl Toluene radiation portal mon-
itors. We study the computational and asymptotic properties of the
proposed method and demonstrate its efficacy in simulations. Given
data available to the authorities, it should be feasible to implement
this approach in practice.
1. Introduction. With increased terrorism around the world and insta-
bility in some nuclear-capable nations, there is a growing national safety
concern about terrorists bringing illicit nuclear materials into the U.S. Sub-
stantial efforts have gone into devising strategies for inspecting containers
and intercepting various types of illicit nuclear material. In the U.S. there
are 307 ports of entry representing 621 official air, sea and land border cross-
ing sites, through which approximately 57,000 containers enter the borders
every day. For effective inspection without increasing traffic congestion, the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security has adopted a multilayered approach
to inspection, which consists of an analysis of customs documents, followed
by an inline automatic inspection of the containers, and an offline stringent
manual inspection for suspicious containers. For more details of the pro-
cess and the corresponding risk analysis, we refer to Wein et al. (2006) and
Martonosi, Oritz and Willis (2006).
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One objective of the inline preliminary inspection procedure is to identify
radioactive cargo that is being shipped in a container. The inline prelim-
inary inspection procedure consists of scanning containers in a radiation
portal monitor (RPM) via a gamma ray Polyvinyl Toluene (PVT) scanner.
Currently, 98% of incoming containers go through this radiation scanning
situated at most ports of entry. Based on the data collected during scanning,
the inline inspection procedure makes a quick automatic decision to let a
container pass or to scrutinize it further with the offline process. In addition,
a few containers are randomly selected for offline inspection. For example,
the Los Angeles Times (11/26/2004) reported that at the Los Angeles port
in 2004, around 12,000 containers arrived daily and, on average, 43 were
inspected by hand.
The design of the RPM consists of a drive-through portal with passive
PVT sensors that detect gamma rays emitting from a source. At an inspec-
tion point, the container is driven through the portal at low speed (4–5
mph), taking around 20 seconds. The portal captures the radiation counts
at every 0.1-second interval in a number of energy channels ranging from low
to high. For example, the portals manufactured by SAIC in certain configu-
rations have 256 channels. The next generation of portals based on Sodium
Iodide Scintillators will have 1024 channels. The collected data consist of
the radiation count in each of the channels at every 0.1-second interval, ac-
cumulated over 1 second. In practice, the data are further aggregated over
multiple channels in a number of nonoverlapping coarser windows. Typical
configurations involve 2–8 nonoverlapping exhaustive windows from very low
energy to very high energy. In our paper we focus on nonoverlapping energy
windows, referred to as windows in the rest of this paper. For an excellent
exposition of the details related to energy windowing, we refer to Ely et al.
(2004) and Ely et al. (2006).
Given that the distance from the source changes as a container is driven
through the portal, radiation counts will also change. The upper frame of
Figure 1 shows an example of radiation count data as a container is rolling
through a radiation portal (courtesy of Pacific Northwest National Labo-
ratory). The figure depicts readings of a container passing through a 2-
window system corresponding to the high- and low- energy windows. The
upper frame of the figure superposes the readings of the two windows with
the different scales on the left- and right-hand axes, while the lower frame
plots the ratio of low- to high-energy readings. Currently, only the total
count corresponding to the distance which yields the maximal total count is
used for detection purposes. When the total count exceeds a preset thresh-
old, a container is classified as potentially dangerous. However, this crude
method may fail to detect dangerous man-made sources in small quantities
when mixed with naturally occurring radioactive materials. In Section 5 we
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Fig. 1. Gamma counts as a container of NORM passes a 2-window PVT. The container
passes through the portal for around 23 seconds. The upper frame shows the superposition
of the low- and high-energy windows with different scales. The lower frame gives the ratio
of counts between the two windows.
show a numerical example where all containers have approximately the same
mean total count, which the current inspection cannot differentiate.
In this paper we propose a decision theoretic approach based on Bayesian
methods for identifying suspicious containers using the data collected dur-
ing the inline inspection. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we introduce the available RPM data collected by the inline inspection sys-
tem, and describe a statistical model for the RPM data based on a Poisson
process. In Section 3 we introduce the machinery needed for a Bayesian ap-
proach and propose a naive Bayesian classifier. In Section 4 we show that the
proposed procedure is asymptotically accurate in the sense that the proba-
bility of misclassification goes to zero as the mean radiation counts become
large. In Section 5 we explore the efficacy of our procedure by numerical
examples based on real energy spectra for exact classification. We also pro-
pose an algorithm to simplify the classifier when the objective is limited to
discriminating between dangerous and nondangerous materials. Finally, this
paper concludes with a discussion of some of the implementation challenges
and future extensions.
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2. The Poisson model for radiation emission data. A container may in-
clude man-made radioactive material of high concern, including Highly En-
riched Uranium (HEU) or Weapons Grade Plutonium (WGPu), as well as
other common classes of cargo that have been officially declared in filings
with Customs. Some common classes are naturally occurring radioactive
materials (NORM) and are often misclassified based on the currently de-
ployed methodologies during inline inspection. Some common NORM classes
include fertilizer, kitty litter and refractory material. The radioactivity in
NORM is caused by some ingredients with natural radioactivity, for instance,
clay from some regions in Mexico.
For the remainder of this paper, we tackle the objective of classifying a
container into one of K classes. Initially we consider each class to be either a
NORM or a man-made nuclear material. Later on we shall discuss the situa-
tion involving mixtures of materials. We first introduce the notation for the
radiation data. Let Y denote the class variable, Y = k if the container being
inspected is in the kth class. Let Z denote all of the radiation count data
obtained at a RPM with B windows corresponding to a particular container.
Let Rd = (R1,d, . . . ,RB,d)
′ denote the vector of counts at a distance d= d(t)
away from the detectors. Time t is used as the surrogate of d in Figure 1. Z
is a B × T matrix
Z= (Rd(1),Rd(2), . . . ,Rd(T )) =


R1,d(1) R1,d(2) . . . R1,d(T )
R2,d(1) R1,d(2) . . . R2,d(T )
. . . . . . . . . . . .
RB,d(1) RB,d(2) . . . RB,d(T )

 ,(1)
where T is the total number of sampling times, t= 1, . . . , T . Finally, let Nd
denote the total counts at distance d, Nd =
∑
bRb,d = 1
′Rd.
Poisson models have been frequently used in modeling radiation counts
and other types of emission counts [Karlin and Taylor (1998)]. We use the
following Poisson process model (2) for the RPM count data, which will be
subsequently used to build a naive Bayesian classifier in the next section. Let
M be the quantity of material in a container, and let λb,k be the emission
rate for a unit quantity of class k in window b at the distance d= 0. Given
that a container has M quantity of the kth material class and is at distance
d from the detector,
Rb,d|(Y = k, d,M)∼ Poisson(g(d,M)λb,k)(2)
b= 1, . . . ,B, d= d(1), . . . , d(T ),
where all Rb,d are independent, and g(d,M) is an unknown function. One
would expect g(d,M) to be decreasing in distance d and increasing in quan-
tity M , with g(0,1) = 1. The specific form of g depends on the physical
mechanism of sensors, signal processing and various environmental factors.
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Ely et al. (2004) and Ely et al. (2006) delve into a substantive discussion
of g(d,M) through the amount of information available in Nd, which they
find is very unreliable. Moreover, the function g is associated not only with
distance d and amount of material M , but also with various environmental
conditions (e.g., weather and background noise), vehicle shielding (which
varies from container to container), and a container’s angular placement rel-
ative to the detectors (which changes as the vehicle traverses through the
portal), and sensitivity of sensors. Thus, g is a function of many more vari-
ables than just the quantity and distance. Modeling g would be very difficult
since many factors are unknown or not collected. We will not pursue this
parametric line of inquiry here because of the inherent difficulties mentioned
above and the lack of publicly available data.
Given the difficulties in modeling g, we consider g as a nuisance pa-
rameter and remove it for inference by appropriate conditioning. To real-
ize this, note that Nd follows independent Poisson distributions with mean
g(d,M)
∑
b λb,k. By construction, the conditional distribution is
P (Rd|Nd, Y = k, d,M)∝ P (R1,d, . . . ,RB,d,Nd|Y = k, d,M)
= P (R1,d, . . . ,RB,d|Y = k, d,M).
We then have
P (R1,d, . . . ,RB,d|Y = k, d,M,Nd)
∝
∏
b
[g(d,M)λb,k]
Rb,d/(Rb,d!)(3)
∝
Nd!
R1,d! · · ·RB,d!
(
λb,k
λk
)Rb,d
×
[g(d,M)λk ]
Nd
Nd!
,
where λk =
∑
b λb,k. The marginal distribution of Nd is easily shown to be
Poisson(g(d,M)λk). It follows that the conditional distribution is
Rd|(Y = k, d,M,Nd)∼multinomial(Nd;p1,k, . . . , pB,k),(4)
where pb,k = λb,k/λk, b = 1, . . . ,B. Note that 0 ≤ pb,k ≤ 1 and
∑
b pb,k = 1.
Hence, given Nd, Rd follows a multinomial distribution with the probabil-
ity parameters p1,k, . . . , pB,k independent of d. In addition, by model (2),
Rd(t), t= 1, . . . , T , at different distances are all independent. It follows that,
if we were to base our inference conditioned on Nd, that is, the total ra-
diation count at time d for all windows, we would not require any specific
functional model for g(d,M) and Nd. The lower frame of Figure 1 corre-
sponds to a real data example that validates this assumption. It can be seen
that the ratio in counts between the two windows is approximately constant
during the actual scan lasting around 23 seconds.
6 S. R. DALAL AND B. HAN
Let pk = (p1,k, . . . , pB,k)
′ be named as the energy spectrum of the kth class
in the rest of this paper. The energy spectrum is unique for a material class
and invariant to g(d,M). By the above derivation, we can simply focus on
the energy spectrum pk. This is more pertinent and stable than the total ra-
diation count Nd, which depends on the unknown g(d,M). The disadvantage
of using the conditioning likelihood is that it would not be possible to distin-
guish between two material classes that have an identical energy spectrum.
We also remark that Ely et al. (2006) suggested that an energy windowing
method should be used in conjunction with a gross counting threshold set
at a relatively insensitive level.
The proposed conditional multinomial model has additional advantages as
well. First, we can aggregate or disaggregate windows while keeping the new
counts multinomial. Further, since our multinomial distribution depends on
d only through Nd, we can pool the information from the counts obtained at
many distances. We do not have to depend upon the radiation data at the
maximum of Nd as the current approach does. Finally, conditioning on Nd
allows us to implement a classification approach parallel to the naive Bayes
classifier. We describe the development of the Bayesian classifier in the next
two sections.
3. Bayesian classifier. For an introduction to the naive Bayes classifica-
tion, we refer to Ye (2003) and Klosgen and Zytkow (2002). Here we con-
struct a corresponding generative naive Bayesian classifier. We start with
two distinct material classes k and k′. By the Bayes theorem,
P (Y = k|Z)
P (Y = k′|Z)
=
P (Y = k)P (Z|Y = k)
P (Y = k′)P (Z|Y = k′)
,(5)
where P (Y = k) and P (Y = k′) are the prior probability. Apparently, a
container is classified as class k if (5) is larger than 1. Generalizing this to
K classes, we have the following classifier:
Y = arg max
1≤k≤K
[P (Y = k)P (Z|Y = k)].(6)
It is easily shown [Ferguson (1967)] that this rule is optimal in terms of
Bayes risk as long as the cost of misclassification is the same across the
categories.
The naive Bayesian classifier (6) has a convenient form for computation.
Further conditioning on all Nd(t), t= 1, . . . , T , by (4), we have
P (Z|Y = k,Nd(1), . . . ,Nd(T ))∝
∏
b
p
∑
dRb,d
b,c .(7)
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Equivalently, the classifier can be represented by the log likelihood
Y = arg max
1≤k≤K
[∑
b,d
Rb,d log pb,k + logP (Y = k)
]
(8)
= arg max
1≤k≤K
[1′Z′(logpk) + logP (Y = k)].
This form of the naive Bayesian classifier is straightforward to compute,
especially in the software packages optimized for matrix operations such as
Matlab and R.
The naive Bayesian classifier (6) can be easily extended to accommodate
differential losses to misclassification errors. Let Wk′,k denote the cost of
misclassifying a container to class k′ when it actually belongs to class k.
Let Wk′,k = 0 when k
′ = k. The expected loss of a classification is L(Y =
k′|Z) =
∑K
k=1Wk′,kP (Y = k|Z). The optimal Bayesian decision rule is then
Yw = argmink′ L(Y = k
′|Z). Note that (6) is a special instance using 0–1 loss
of the decision rule Yw.
The Bayesian classifier in this section assumes that the energy spectra pk
is known for a variety of material classes. In the remainder of this section
we discuss the Bayesian learning to reduce the uncertainty in estimating pk
for both lab and field practices. Given Y = k, that is, the material class is
known either by experimental set up or by an offline detailed inspection,
we consider the conjugate prior for pk, that is, the Dirichlet(θ1,k, . . . , θB,k)
distribution. Then, training our classifier on the data obtained from past
containers with known classes, we estimate pk by
pˆb,k =
(∑
i,d
Rib,d + θb,k
)/(∑
i,b,d
Rib,d +
∑
b
θb,k
)
,(9)
where Rib,d is the radiation count for the ith container in the kth class.
The summations over i are over the containers with class k contents in the
training data.
For determining the parameters of the conjugate priors, one would typi-
cally use expert judgment. However, given the number of containers passing
through U.S. ports, a prior is unlikely to have any significant effect on the
ultimate decision except when the class is very rare. Typically, conjugate pri-
ors are somewhat restrictive in terms of the beliefs they can represent. Dalal
and Hall (1983) and Diaconis and Ylvisaker (1985) show that an appro-
priate mixture of natural conjugate priors can approximate any arbitrary
belief when the underlying distributions belong to an exponential family.
Further, the corresponding posteriors converge almost surely to the true
posterior. Given these results, it is possible to extend this development to
mixtures of Dirichlet as priors for multinomial parameters. Using the results
shown in those papers, it can be shown that the resulting estimates are the
re-weighted mixtures of the estimates in (9).
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4. Asymptotic properties. We have so far shown that the proposed pro-
cedure is an optimal Bayesian classifier. In this section we study the proper-
ties of our procedure for a fixed but arbitrary K, by the asymptotic means
assuming the Poisson model (2) and the multinomial model (4), respectively.
We first consider the proposed classifier with K classes with energy spec-
tra pk, k = 1, . . . ,K, under the multinomial model (4) by conditioning on
N =
∑
dNd. For the development below, we consider the nontrivial case
where all energy spectra are positive and distinct corresponding to each of
the material class. Let pk′ be the true energy spectrum. The optimal Bayes
classifier is Y = k′ if and only if (6) holds for Y = k′, namely,
k′ = argmax
k
P (Y = k)P (Z|Y = k).
Taking log of ratio of the terms corresponding to k′ and k, this is true if and
only if
log
P (Z|Y = k′)P (Y = k′)
P (Z|Y = k)P (Y = k)
≥ 0 for all k.(10)
Let Lb =
∑
dRb,d and N =
∑
dNd. Since (L1, . . . ,LB)|N follows a multino-
mial distribution with parameters (N ;pk′), by substituting the likelihood of
P (Z|Y ) for Y = k and k′, we have (10) if and only if
1
N
[∑
b
Lb log
pb,k′
pb,k
+ log
P (Y = k′)
P (Y = k)
]
≥ 0.(11)
Since Lb follows binomial(N,pb,k′), we have |Lb/N − pb,k′ |= op(1). Further,
the second term in (11) is O(N−1). Thus, the left-hand side of (11) is
∑
b
[
pb,k′ log
pb,k′
pb,k
+ op(1) +O(N
−1)
]
= η(pk′ ,pk) + op(1)(12)
as N →∞,
where η(pk′ ,pk) =
∑
b pb,k′ log
pb,k′
pb,k
is the Kullback–Leibler divergence be-
tween the two multinomial distributions with parameters (1;pk′), and (1;pk).
By the properties of the Kullback–Leibler divergence and the Gibbs’ inequal-
ity, η(pk′ ,pk)≥ infs,s 6=k′ η(pk′ ,ps)> 0 for all k 6= k
′. Thus, k′ will be selected
with probability approaching 1.
Now we generalize the above result, which says that our classifier is
consistent for the multinomial case to the general Poisson case without
conditioning on N . For the Poisson case, we have the total mean counts
across d as λk′ =
∑
b,d g(d,M)λb,k′ . Suppressing the subscript k
′, as λ→∞,
N/λ= 1+ op(1), and thus, dividing the left-hand side of equation (10) by λ
again gives equation (12). Thus, again, k′ will be selected with probability
approaching 1. Summarizing this, we have the following theorem.
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Theorem 1. Under the multinomial model (4) and the Poisson model
(2) and the assumption that all energy spectra p1, . . . ,pK are distinguishable,
as λ→∞, for a given true class k′ in 1, . . . ,K, P (Y = k′|Z)
p
→ 1.
According to this result, irrespective of K, as long as all energy spectra
are distinct, as the counts become large, the classifier proposed here will con-
verge to the true underlying material. Further, it follows from the proof that
for given counts, the probability of misclassification is higher for materials
closer in the Kullback–Leibler divergence sense.
We now consider robustness of our procedure to changes in the true un-
derlying energy distribution. By an argument that is an extension of the
one used in proving the above theorem, the following theorem can be shown
similarly.
Theorem 2. Under the multinomial model (4) and the Poisson model
(2), and an arbitrary energy spectrum, p∗ = (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
B) not in p1, . . . ,pK .
Let k′ = argmin1≤k≤K η(p
∗,pk). Then as λ→∞, P (Y = k
′|Z)
p
→ 1.
This result shows that even if the true distribution is not in the classifi-
cation scheme, the ones closest to it will be selected. In this sense we have
robustness with respect to variations in the underlying distribution.
Remark. Robustness with respect to correlated data. In the develop-
ment above, we assumed that Rb,d are all independent over d. One would
expect by the underlying physics that radiation counts are independent in
different time intervals. Given that our development parallels the naive Bayes
models, it follows that the classifier (6) is robust to this violation. For fur-
ther discussion of this we refer to Domingos and Pazzani (1997) and Zhang
(2004) who show robustness of the models with violations to independence.
In summary, the results indicate that our procedure is robust with respect
to variations in the underlying distribution and will scale up to large numbers
of categories as long as the counts are large. The counts increase if either M
increases, the speed of driving through the portal decreases or the number
of d’s increase. Thus, from a policy perspective, for improving the detection
probability, the most attractive option is to pool across d’s. It can also be
shown by the Gibbs inequality that as the number of windows increases by
further refinement, the corresponding Kullback–Leibler divergence between
any two distributions also increases. Thus, for the next attractive option,
one needs to carry out a cost–benefit analysis between reducing the speed
and increasing the number of windows.
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5. Numerical studies.
5.1. Classification of all classes. To explore and illustrate the sensitivity
and specificity of our method, we consider a number of simulated examples
and scenarios. The first example is based on energy spectra emitted by the
following 7 classes of material: WGPu, HEU, fertilizer, tiles (refractory ma-
terial), kitty litter, road salt and background (i.e., a container’s radiation
is undetectable from the background). The energy spectra were synthesized
from a few sources, including Ely et al. (2004) and Ely et al. (2006), presenta-
tions from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and consultation
with PNNL scientists. For these data, the reported energy spectra only con-
sisted of 3 windows. Table 1 lists the energy spectra of mean counts for 1
unit of the 6 pure material classes and background at the distance defined
as d= 0. The man-made nuclear material classes were chosen based on their
importance for detection in ports, while the NORM classes were selected
based on their probability of misclassification indicated in Table 2 (courtesy
of PNNL). Radiation from the NORM classes is primarily from potassium-
40, which naturally exists in many common materials. For reference, false
positive probabilities for some typical NORM materials are shown in Table
2 (compiled from personal communications with PNNL), per the currently
deployed method and publicly available data. The units of quantity are dif-
ferent for different classes. Ely et al. (2004) and Ely et al. (2006) considered
1 unit WGPu as 99.4 g in a powdered oxide form and doubly contained
in schedule-80 stainless steel closed pipes that provide shielding. Even with
shielding, 1 unit WGPu is still highly radioactive. 1 unit HEU was consid-
ered as 123 g of 93.1% enriched uranium consisting of a number of stacked
foils, which is a moderately strong radiation source. For all NORM material
classes, 1 unit is 5 kg. We also consider another man-made class as a mixture
of 0.5 unit HEU and 0.5 unit of WGPu.
Table 1
The energy spectra for the 6 pure material classes and background. Numbers in
parentheses are λb,k
Class Window 1 Window 2 Window 3
HEU 0.954 (1.77× 104) 0.033 (616) 0.013 (247)
Fertilizer 0.635 (2.72× 103) 0.243 (1.0× 103) 0.122 (519)
Tile 0.658 (2.22× 103) 0.242 (818) 0.100 (338)
WGPu 0.934 (6.09× 104) 0.061 (3.9× 103) 0.005 (285)
Kitty litter 0.631 (1.7× 103) 0.292 (790) 0.077 (208)
Road salt 0.662 (2.1× 103) 0.273 (873) 0.065 (208)
Background 0.651 (1.4× 103) 0.249 (519) 0.100 (207)
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Table 2
Some frequently misclassified NORM classes by the currently deployed methodology.
Numbers are proportions of false positive for detecting radiation risk
Source class Port A Port B Port C
Kitty litter 0.34 0.25 –
Abrasive pads 0.14 0.05 –
Mica 0.05 – –
Fertilizer 0.05 0.13 –
Ceramics/tile 0.04 0.09 0.28
Granite 0.04 – 0.10
Salt – 0.05 –
Trucks/cars 0.02 – –
Aluminum – 0.15 –
Other metal – 0.03 –
To numerically simulate the radiation data, we set up g(d,M) = (1−d)M
and 20 distances (0.9,0.8, . . . ,0.1,0,0,0.1, . . . ,0.9), corresponding to the por-
tal passing-through time for a container. As discussed previously, the specific
form of g(d,M) does not affect the Bayesian classifier, but is only needed
for generating data. This simulation scenario is set up to have the total
counts
∑
dNd comparable to the actual scanning process shown in Figure
1. In the first simulation study, we generated 10,000 samples of Poisson
variables at each d for a variety of material classes. We assign a prior prob-
ability 10−9 to each man-made source, and use equal prior probability for
each NORM class. Table 3 reports the misclassification probabilities. The
Bayesian classifier has excellent performance in this scenario. It was able to
classify all materials correctly except for minor confusion between tiles and
background, both not dangerous. In particular, there is no misclassification
between man-made source and NORM in 10,000 simulations.
Remark. At this scale of total counts, the classifier is relatively insen-
sitive to the choice of prior P (Y = k). From (8), it can be seen that as long
as log(P (Y = k)) = op(1
′Z), the prior should have no practical impact on
the classifier. Recall that the actual counts are large (see Figure 1). Hence,
the prior probability for man-made source is unlikely to influence the clas-
sification remarkably. Since the total counts in simulations are also large
(comparable to Figure 1), there is not a single change in misclassifying a
man-made source to NORM, or vice versa, if we use the equal prior proba-
bility on all classes, or change the prior probability of each man-made source
to 10−9.
We now study a more complex situation by considering a more devious
terrorist strategy of mixing materials. The man-made source possessed by
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Table 3
Summary of classification simulations with 8 classes. Classes A to H are WGPu (A),
HEU (B), mixture of 0.5 unit. WGPu and 0.5 unit HEU (C), fertilizer (D), tile (E),
kitty litter (F), salt (G) and background (H)
Classified
True class A B C D E F G H
A 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
C 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
D 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
E 0 0 0 0 0.937 0 0 0.063
F 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
G 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
H 0 0 0 0 0.111 0 0 0.889
terrorists, such as WGPu or HEU, may be mixed with a NORM material
class. Moreover, the total count may be made small enough to pass the
current inline inspection. Hence, to challenge the classifier, the main sensitive
material classes should allow mixtures of man-made and NORM classes. For
hard to detect situations, the mixture should have a small quantity of a man-
made source and a relatively large quantity of NORM. In the next numerical
study, we consider this possibility by using a list of mixtures of the known
classes except for background. Each mixture class mixes WGPu or HEU with
one of the 4 NORM classes. Assuming that the mixture is noninterfering,
the energy spectrum for the mixture of two classes k and k′ with quantities
M and M ′ will be given by
[(1− d)Mλb,k + (1− d)M
′λb,k′ ]∑
b[(1− d)Mλb,k + (1− d)M
′λb,k′)]
, b= 1, . . . ,B.(13)
We considered 3 small quantities for each man-made source class to sim-
ulate the different diluting effects. The quantity of HEU was 0.025, 0.05
or 0.1 unit, and the quantity of WGPu was 0.005, 0.01 or 0.025 unit. The
quantity of HEU is slightly larger than WGPu due to the relatively weaker
radioactivity by the definition of 1 unit HEU. All of the classes being in-
spected except for background have the same mean count in the first window.
Since the first window has much larger counts than the other two windows,
a real container of all these classes will have approximately the same to-
tal counts. We set the mean count at distance d = 0 in the first window,
Mλ1,k +M
′λ1,k′ at 3000 for all mixture classes. The quantity of all NORM
classes is solved from the preceding restriction. For example, the mixture
class “0.025HEU + Fertilizer” has 0.025 unit HEU and 0.941 unit fertil-
izer. The mean value 3000 was set to be close to 1 unit of NORM and far
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less than 1 unit of a man-made source, representing a scenario that could
be encountered at port inspection. It is likely that the currently deployed
method will not detect most of the containers with small quantities of HEU
or WGPu, since it is based on maximal gross counts. We also considered
the 4 pure NORM classes and the background. Except for background, the
quantities of the 4 NORM classes were set according to Mλ1,k = 3000. For
instance, the pure kitty litter class under this constraint has 1.759 units.
This gave a total of 29 material classes to be classified. We call the mixture
classes with man-made source as dangerous classes, and the NORM classes
and background as nondangerous classes. Since the material classes have
energy spectra consisting of 3 windows, we can plot the corresponding pro-
portion of spectra in two energy windows, which is shown in Figure 2. As
can be seen, some dangerous and nondangerous classes are intermingled.
The Bayesian classifier again has very good performance in this scenario.
For all dangerous classes, the misclassification probability is below 0.005
(including misclassified as other dangerous classes). Most of the misclassi-
fication probabilities for NORM classes are below 0.01, except for the mis-
classifications between tile and background (0.06 for misclassifying tile as
background, and 0.11 for misclassifying background as tile). This indicates
that the Bayesian classifier scales well and is hard to defeat by the simple
strategy of mixing a man-made nuclear material with a NORM.
5.2. Classification into dangerous versus nondangerous classes. In the
previous section we examined the problem of exact classification of all ma-
terials, and, consequently, we used all material classes to build the classifier.
Here we consider a more limited objective for preliminary screening, namely,
Fig. 2. Illustrations of classes. The left frame has all 29 classes as benchmark and
the right frame has 10 automatic selected benchmarks. Circle: dangerous nonbenchmark;
cross: dangerous benchmark; ×: nondangerous benchmark; triangle: nondangerous non-
benchmark.
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classify a given material as dangerous or nondangerous from a given large
list of K dangerous (material involving man-made nuclear sources including
mixtures) and nondangerous materials. After classifying in these categories,
one can use a scheme akin to the previous section to identify the specific
dangerous material at the next stage.
Given this limited objective, and that there may not be any natural differ-
entiation (e.g., hyperplane in some transformed space) in the spectra profile
of dangerous and nondangerous materials, this problem cannot be solved by
the standard binary classification methods. Instead, we consider the follow-
ing scheme, whereby we build the classifier based on a subset of materials
(called benchmark classes) from the list. A material is classified as dangerous
if the corresponding selected benchmark material is dangerous; otherwise it
is nondangerous.
For this setting, the simplest scheme would be to use all materials as
benchmark classes. The question we address is the following: can one be more
parsimonious in the number of benchmark materials to build the classifier?
Having a smaller number of benchmark classes of materials should help
in scaling up the solution. Below we first investigate this question in the
context of 29 materials considered in the last subsection and compare this
“all classes” solution with an algorithmically derived solution.
The algorithm to select benchmark classes is iterative and does not require
specific structure of the materials. It is motivated by the support vector ma-
chine method and forward selection method [Hastie, Tibshirani and Fried-
man (2009)]. However, unlike the support vector machine method, which
finds the separating hyperplane with the biggest margin, we identify high
leverage points that are difficult to distinguish and use them as benchmark
classes and we iterate on the scheme by forward selection. Given that the
total counts are large in our applications, for identifying a high leverage
point, we revert to Theorem 2, which states that if a class is not in the clas-
sifier, the class nearest in the Kullback–Leibler sense will be selected by the
classifier. For describing the algorithm, the following notation is in order.
Suppose that of the K major distinct classes, K1 classes are dangerous, and
K2 classes are nondangerous, all with distinct energy spectra. Let D and
ND be the corresponding sets of material. At the ith iteration, the algo-
rithm produces a list of dangerous and nondangerous material to be used as
the benchmark class for the next stage, and let us denote those subclasses
as Di and NDi. Finally, let η(p,A) = inf{η(p,pk), k ∈ A}, where η(p,pk)
is the Kullback–Leibler divergence defined in Section 4. The algorithm for
selecting benchmark classes is as follows.
Algorithm.
(a) For i= 1, initiate by taking D1 and ND1 to be any pair of dangerous
and nondangerous material which are nearest in η∗, the symmetrized version
of η [i.e., η∗(p,q) = η(p,q) + η(q,p)].
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(b) At the stage i+1, let ADi+1 = {k :k ∈D−Di, η(pk,Di)−η(pk,NDi)>
0} and ANDi+1 = {k :k ∈ ND − NDi, η(pk,NDi) − η(pk,Di) > 0}. Note
that if the total counts are large, ADi will be misclassified with high prob-
ability as nondangerous and vice versa.
(c) If ADi+1 and ANDi+1 are empty, then stop. Otherwise Di+1 =Di ∪
k∗, where
k∗ = arg min
k∈ADi+1
η(pk,NDi).
Similarly construct NDi+1.
(d) Repeat this process till ADi+1 and ANDi+1 are empty. Note that
when we stop, we have asymptotically probability 1 of correct classification
of materials in dangerous and nondangerous classes.
In our previous example with 29 classes, the above algorithm leads to only
10 benchmark classes. Table 4 gives the corresponding probabilities of mis-
classification. All solutions have exceptional performance and are indistin-
guishable. Based on this comparison, if the binary classification is the main
objective, it would be always preferable to use the algorithmic approach,
since it reduces the complexity without penalizing performance. Further, it
does not require any specific structure of the materials.
Next, we examine the performance of the algorithm in a large study with
100 classes, consisting of 75 dangerous and 25 nondangerous. The danger-
ous classes were mixtures of a man-made source with 4 NORM classes. The
Table 4
Summary of simulations with 29 classes: numbers are the probability of detecting
dangerous radioactive materials. The two columns under each class correspond to all 29
classes as benchmark and the automatic selected benchmark. The selected benchmark
classes are marked with a star
0.025HEU+Fertilizer 1 1 0.005WGPu +Fertilizer* 1 1
0.05HEU+Fertilizer 1 1 0.01WGPu +Fertilizer 1 1
0.1HEU+Fertilizer 1 1 0.025WGPu +Fertilizer 1 1
0.025HEU+Tile 1 1 0.005WGPu +Tile* 1 1
0.05HEU+Tile 1 1 0.01WGPu +Tile 1 1
0.1HEU+Tile 1 1 0.025WGPu +Tile 1 1
0.025HEU+Kitty litter* 0.997 0.997 0.005WGPu +Kitty litter* 0.999 1
0.05HEU+Kitty litter 1 1 0.01WGPu +Kitty litter* 0.999 1
0.1HEU+Kitty litter 1 1 0.025WGPu +Kitty litter 1 1
0.025HEU+ Salt 1 1 0.005WGPu + Salt* 1 1
0.05HEU+ Salt 1 1 0.01WGPu +Salt 1 1
0.1HEU+Salt 1 1 0.025WGPu + Salt 1 1
Fertilizer* 0 0 Tile* 0 0
Kitty litter* 0 0 Salt* 0.011 0.012
Background 0 0
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quantity of man-made source was either 0.025 unit HEU or 0.005 WGPu,
and the quantities of 4 NORM classes were generated from a Dirichlet dis-
tribution with parameters (0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25). The nondangerous classes
were mixtures of 4 NORM classes, and the quantities were generated inde-
pendently from U(0,0.25). This scenario is more stringent than the previ-
ous scenarios, since this scenario uses the smallest quantities of man-made
sources used in the previous scenarios. We generated 50 sets of classes. The
mean number of benchmark classes chosen by the algorithm is 6.9 and the
standard deviation (sd) is 5.7. The median number of benchmark classes
is 5 and the median absolute deviation (mad) is 6. For each of the 50 sets
of generated classes, we ran 1000 simulations to evaluate the performance.
The mean probability of misclassifying a dangerous class as nondangerous is
0.001 (median = 0.000, sd = 0.009, mad = 0.000), and the mean probability
of misclassifying a nondangerous class as dangerous is 0.008 (median = 0.000,
sd = 0.037, mad = 0.000).
In summary, the numerical examples in this section show that the par-
simonious benchmark classes chosen by the proposed algorithm retain the
capability of detecting illicit nuclear material and are more efficient in com-
putation.
6. Discussion. We have proposed a Bayesian approach for modeling the
energy distribution as well as the total energy emitted by an unknown ma-
terial class. We have also proposed a Bayesian decision rule for classifying
a new container into one of the known classes. Our approach uses all avail-
able data compared to the currently deployed method, which only uses the
maximal counts. We have examined its robustness properties by simulations
and asymptotic arguments and have shown that the proposed approach is
scalable. For binary classification between dangerous and nondangerous ma-
terials, we have proposed a scalable algorithm for selecting a small number
of benchmark classes motivated by the support vector machine and forward
selection methods. The results in this paper are encouraging compared to
the false positives reported by the currently deployed method in Table 2.
Since our approach is based on classification, two questions naturally
emerge for our and other classification approaches, namely, (1) to what ex-
tent is the procedure robust with respect to variation in the underlying
distribution? and (2) to what extent can one entertain the possibility of
none of the above classes? Theorem 2 and ensuing discussion show that our
approach is robust in the sense that even if the true distribution is not in
the classifier, the benchmark class closest to it will be selected. While our
and all other classification approaches do not allow a direct answer to the
second question, it should be feasible to perform a Chi-squared goodness
of fit test for the selected class. If such a test rejects the hypothesis, then
one possibility is to screen such a container. Clearly, the efficacy of such
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a simultaneous procedure needs to be further investigated. Also, since our
approach does not depend upon the number of windows and the time to
pass-through the portal, it is likely to be easily extendable to newer portals,
more windows, material classes and changes in design.
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